For more than a decade, South Africans have endured declining economic growth, persistent load shedding, and weak governance. Growth in real gross domestic product (GDP) has averaged less than 1% since 2014. It is tempting to think that this decline could continue indefinitely but we have already absorbed the worst shocks. Barring a severe political or service-delivery shock, the probability of a sustained collapse to zero or negative growth is very low.

Electricity: From collapse to stabilisation

Eskom has turned a corner. In 2023, South Africa (SA) experienced nearly 300 days of rolling blackouts but, in 2024, that number fell to 69 days. By mid-2025, the grid had delivered more than 100 consecutive days without load shedding, with the energy availability factor holding in the mid-60s. The electricity crisis is not solved but the structural break risk from total grid failure has eased.

Logistics: Still weak but reforming

Transnet remains a major bottleneck, with freight rail volumes at multi-decade lows. But reform momentum is visible. Government has guaranteed R51 billion to stabilise Transnet’s balance sheet, is opening freight rail to private operators, and has launched the concessioning of container terminals. Execution will take years but the reform vector is finally positive.

Institutions still hold

SA is not Zimbabwe or Venezuela. The Reserve Bank’s constitutional independence has withstood political pressure; the judiciary continues to check executive overreach; and civil society remains engaged. According to the World Justice Project (2024), SA ranks 57th globally and 5th in Sub-Saharan Africa for the rule of law. This institutional resilience is crucial and makes outright collapse unlikely.

Politics: A centrist drift

The only credible downside risk is a radical political swing to the left. If the Economic Freedom Fighters or uMkhonto we Sizwe were to win a national election, expropriation and nationalisation could become policy, breaking our fragile stability. But the 2024 elections showed how improbable that is. The result of the elections was a centrist Government of National Unity. Across most of the country, voters are increasingly rejecting hate speech and empty promises. Going forward, coalition politics makes a hard-left pivot highly improbable.

Growth: Modest but the only way is up

No one should expect 3% to 5% annual growth soon. High unemployment, poor education outcomes, and low investment keep the ceiling low. But the floor is firming: With electricity stabilising, logistics improving, and coalition politics drifting centre-right, 1% to 2% real GDP growth looks achievable over the next few years. Relative to the global context, that stability matters. The International Monetary Fund projects advanced economies to grow just 1.4%. SA’s growth may not dazzle but in a slowing world, it can increasingly look resilient.

The rand’s outlook

Currency markets often overshoot on fear. For years, the rand priced in rolling crises. With risks plateauing, the downside diminishes. By August 2025, the rand had touched a nine-month high, with the real effective exchange rate back near its long-run average. If the United States’ rates ease and SA sustains incremental reforms, the rand could trend firmer, helping anchor inflation and consumer confidence.

Risks that remain

Two domestic fragilities still deserve caution. First, water infrastructure and municipal finances are weak, with Gauteng already experiencing severe outages. A water crisis could hit growth as hard as Eskom once did. Second, the fiscal path is tight: Debt is projected to peak at 77% of GDP in 2025/2026, and any revenue shortfall or bailout could push this even higher. External risks, such as trade tensions, also need to be monitored.

Stabilisation, not collapse

SA has little chance of a golden era of rapid growth but it also faces minimal risk of collapse into failed-state status. The structural breaks are behind us. With electricity stabilising, logistics reforming, politics consolidating to the centre, and institutions holding, the most likely future is one of slow, steady stabilisation. Growth of 1% to 2% per year may sound modest but it signals that the worst is over. In a slowing world, SA can, once again, look comparatively strong.

This article has been published on Moneyweb.

Markets are being pulled in multiple directions: Technology supply chains are under strain, central banks are caught between inflation and growth, and new financial hubs are emerging. Each shift illustrates how politics and policy increasingly shape market outcomes.

Nvidia in the crosshairs

Beijing’s restrictions on Nvidia’s H20 chip (a weaker, China-specific processor) highlight how sovereignty now defines technology. The move followed blunt remarks by United States (US) Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, who said that America would never sell China its “best” chips. Chinese regulators quickly urged companies (like Alibaba and ByteDance) to pause or shrink Nvidia orders, favouring domestic producers (such as Huawei and Cambricon). For Nvidia, already barred from selling its most advanced processors in China, the setback underscores how geopolitics trumps commercial logic. For investors, the lesson is clear: Chips are no longer just about performance but also about national security. This politicisation of supply chains will continue to shape valuations and global capital flows.

The Fed’s stagflation puzzle

While technology divides the US and China, America’s central bankers face their own challenge. Economic data indicate slowing job growth, stubborn inflation, and tariffs that increase costs while reducing demand. Minutes from the Federal Reserve’s (Fed’s) July meeting revealed a split: Some urged patience while others said cuts could not wait for “complete clarity” on tariff effects. Markets now expect a quarter-point cut in September. Yet, the Fed risks either reigniting inflation by easing too soon or tipping demand into contraction by holding steady. It is the classic stagflation dilemma (weak growth with persistent price pressures), echoing the 1970s. Adding to the pressure is fiscal dominance: Governments leaning on central banks to contain surging debt costs. In the US, President Trump openly demands lower rates to ease servicing burdens. Elsewhere, higher long-term yields in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan reflect the same tension between fiscal policy and monetary independence.

Europe’s resilience

Across the Atlantic, the eurozone showed unexpected momentum. The HCOB Eurozone Purchasing Managers’ Index rose to 51.1 in August, its eighth month above 50 and the strongest since May 2023. Both manufacturing and services expanded despite new US tariffs. However, inflationary pressures in services remain elevated, complicating the European Central Bank’s decisions. For now, markets expect rates to stay on hold, reflecting Frankfurt’s cautious stance.

Abu Dhabi: A rising capital of capital

While Western policymakers wrestle with inflation and debt, the Gulf is deploying financial firepower. Abu Dhabi, with $1.7 trillion in sovereign wealth, is positioning itself as the “capital of capital”. Hedge funds (such as Brevan Howard) and asset managers (like BlackRock and Nuveen) have opened offices in the Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM) financial district. Unlike Dubai’s banking hub, Abu Dhabi focuses on asset managers seeking proximity to sovereign wealth funds. Registrations at ADGM surged 41% in the past year. With tax advantages, regulatory flexibility, and regional stability, the emirate has become a magnet for global financiers searching for growth beyond New York or London.

Indonesia’s warning

Not all economies are moving forward. Indonesia, once a manufacturing engine, is slipping into “premature deindustrialisation”. Manufacturing’s share of gross domestic product has fallen from 32% in 2002 to 19% today. The collapse of textile giant Sritex, alongside closures of suppliers to global brands, has left tens of thousands unemployed. Instead, investment has shifted to commodities such as nickel and palm oil. These capital-heavy industries generate fewer jobs and leave household demand weaker. Growth still hovers near 5% but purchasing power is eroding, the middle class is shrinking, and informal work is rising. For a country once seen as a demographic powerhouse, the risks are mounting.

What does all of this mean?

From Beijing’s chip restrictions to the Fed’s policy dilemma, from Europe’s quiet resilience to Abu Dhabi’s rise, and Indonesia’s struggles, the global economy is being reshaped by politics as much as by markets.

Some regions are adapting, while others are faltering. For investors, the rule is simple: fundamentals matter, but in today’s world, politics, power, and perception often move markets first.

This article has been published on Moneyweb.

The global economy resembles a chessboard, with each region playing its own strategy. Three stories now connect in telling ways: China is battling deflation with a new slogan, India is profiting from discounted Russian crude, and emerging markets are racing back to international bond markets on a wave of investor optimism.

China’s “anti-involution” push

China’s leaders love slogans. From “supply-side reforms” to “housing is for living, not speculation”. These slogans often signal where policy is headed. The latest phrase is “anti-involution”. Involution describes the grind of producers that expand capacity, slash prices, and watch profits evaporate. Anti-involution aims to stop that spiral by curbing excess capacity.

The mismatch is stark. China’s solar capacity is already more than twice the global demand, and electric vehicle battery output is roughly 1.3 times more than what is needed. The price consequences are everywhere. The gross domestic product deflator has decreased for nine consecutive quarters, while consumer prices have averaged just 0.1% year-on-year since mid-2023. Unlike 2015, when commodity swings did most of the damage, deflation is now broad-based across manufactured goods. Beijing faces a tough choice: Accept slower growth by cutting capacity, or continue overproducing and deepen the trap. What is really needed is rebalancing: Shifting towards household consumption, especially for migrant workers and rural families whose saving rates exceed 40%.

India’s oil math

While China wrestles with deflation, India has turned itself into a refinery hub for Russian crude. The mechanism is simple: United States (US) and European consumers buy Indian goods, delivering dollars. Those dollars purchase discounted Russian oil. India refines the oil and resells it worldwide, while Moscow collects hard currency to fund its war in Ukraine. Before 2022, Russia supplied less than 1% of India’s crude. Today, it exceeds 30%, or about 1.5 million barrels a day. Much of that inflow is exported as higher-value fuels. Indian refiners pocket healthy margins; Russia’s war chest is replenished; Western taxpayers continue to finance Ukrainian war efforts. Washington’s patience has, however, become thin. New 25% US tariffs on Indian goods, layered on existing reciprocal tariffs, send a blunt message: India cannot pose as a strategic partner while funnelling dollar revenues towards Russian crude.

An emerging market debt rush

With China slowing and India drawing tariff fire, you might expect investors to flee risk. Instead, emerging-market debt sales are surging at their fastest pace since 2021. By July, borrowers outside China had issued roughly $250 billion in bonds, on course to nearly match pandemic-era peaks. Why the appetite? Spreads over US Treasuries have narrowed to their lowest levels since 2007, as markets bet the Federal Reserve will soon ease policy. Governments from Saudi Arabia to Mexico are seizing the moment to fund infrastructure, energy projects, and even bailouts. Corporations are returning after years of high borrowing costs. For now, sentiment is upbeat but history warns that easy credit often seeds tomorrow’s instability.

One theme, three fronts

China’s deflation fight, India’s oil arbitrage, and the emerging market bond boom look like separate tales but they share a common thread: The hunt for growth in a world where the old engines no longer run as before. The danger is that, in chasing quick fixes, leaders postpone the deeper reforms that would result in sustainable growth. The playbook is clear: China must lift household incomes and shrink politically protected overcapacity. India needs to reconcile strategic partnerships with energy opportunism, or accept rising trade frictions. Emerging-market borrowers should use cheaper funding to invest in productivity, resilience, and governance. The next phase of the cycle will reward realism over rhetoric: Policy choices that re-anchor demand, right-size capacity, and turn today’s market window into tomorrow’s durable growth.

This article has been published on Moneyweb.