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If dreaded disease cover is left disregarded and you or a loved one is diagnosed with a serious ailment, it could lead to financial distress or even bankruptcy.
If dreaded disease cover is left disregarded and you or a loved one is diagnosed with a serious ailment, it could lead to financial distress or even bankruptcy.
The global economic landscape has been experiencing a tightening cycle for roughly a year, and it is becoming apparent that its effects are both spreading and deepening as disequilibrium becomes more apparent. Recently, we have also experienced that the banking system is likely to be a contributor to the damage being done. The flow of liquidity from cash and credit to assets and spending is critical to the success of economies, and the combination of central banks raising interest rates and draining reserves, coupled with banks experiencing more constrained deposit and capital conditions and tightening credit standards, is likely to constrain the flow of money and credit to markets and economies. This, in turn, is likely to have a detrimental impact on spending and income.
Three major equilibriums and two major policy levers interact to drive markets and economies. The first equilibrium in the rich world is spending and output in line with capacity, which roughly translates into approximately 2% real growth with 2% inflation, a nominal spending growth rate of 4% to 5%, and an average unemployment rate. The second equilibrium is that debt growth must be in line with income growth, meaning credit growth that is not too high or too low, with interest rates that act as neither a major incentive nor disincentive to borrow. The third equilibrium is a normal level of risk premiums in assets relative to cash, meaning that bonds provide an expected return above cash, and equities an expected return above bonds, commensurate with these assets’ risks. The two policy levers are monetary policy and fiscal policy. The economic and market swings that we see reflect the never-ending struggles of the marketplace and of policymakers to achieve equilibrium. In the West, we are far from equilibrium, while in the East, we are closer to it. The closer an economy is to equilibrium, the easier it is to fix problems and the lower market volatility.
In developed economies, high nominal spending, when compared with the ability of an economy to produce more, remains the greatest disruption to equilibrium today. This leads to inflation that is significantly above target, leading to big policy shifts and high market volatility. Despite aggressive policy action, the United States (US), Europe, and the United Kingdom (UK) have not moved much closer to equilibrium. On the margin, the nature of the disequilibrium has shifted from too much inflation to not enough growth, with the risk premiums on assets decreasing relative to cash.
The path from disequilibrium to equilibrium allows for big market swings. When looking at why the economy is in bearish disequilibrium, we see that inflation is too high. Nominal spending, in turn, is too high to bring inflation down and unemployment is too low to bring wages down, and despite nominal growth being too high, the real growth rate is lower than desired. In the end, a weaker real growth rate, that is, an earnings recession of sorts, is required to resolve the other imbalances.
In conclusion, the effects of the recent tightening cycle are spreading and deepening, and the damage to the banking system is a manifestation of this tightening. Markets are in disequilibrium and the high level of nominal spending remains the greatest disruption to equilibrium today. Despite aggressive policy action, the US, Europe, and the UK have not moved much closer to equilibrium. The path from disequilibrium to equilibrium allows for big market swings, which is a frame of reference for longer-term positioning. It is thus crucial for policymakers and market participants to remain vigilant and proactive when managing these risks and when taking steps towards a more stable and sustainable economic environment.
Dr Francois Stofberg
Managing Director: Efficient Private Clients.
To understand why more interest rate increases in South Africa (SA) may not effectively combat inflation, one must first understand the broader economic factors that contribute to higher inflation rates in emerging countries when compared with developed nations. According to research conducted by various institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (2018), the World Bank (2021), Alhassan and Biekpe (2020), and our own studies, weak economic fundamentals, political instability, commodity dependence, exchange rate volatility, and the United States (US) dollar surcharge, are major contributors to relatively higher levels of inflation in these countries.
Despite the South African Reserve Bank’s (SARB’s) status as an independent and healthy institution, the country’s poorly-managed state and lack of fiscal discipline negate many of the benefits that a strong central bank may provide. Political instability further exacerbates the issue. Also, as a commodity-dependent country, SA is susceptible to inflationary pressures when global demand for scarce resources increases. Furthermore, with a volatile currency and a reliance on imports, SA is vulnerable to import inflation.
Typically, exchange rate disparities are driven by inflation differentials between countries and a ‘sentiment’ factor, which represents consumers’, businesses’, and investors’ perceptions of a country. In SA, inflation differentials have accounted for nearly 73% of the difference in the USD/ZAR exchange rate since 1980, with sentiment contributing to the remaining 27%. However, sentiment can be volatile in the short term, resulting in exchange rate fluctuations. For example, negative long-term sentiment towards emerging markets, particularly SA, most likely caused the rand to depreciate by 7.75% and 16.42% in 2021 and 2022, respectively, despite having lower inflation rates than the US.
Developed and competitive countries, such as the US, Japan, German, and Switzerland, typically have strong exchange rates owing to lower inflation rates and supportive sentiment, which attract short-term capital for investment in their financial markets. In contrast, countries that are competitive but not developed, such as China, India, Malaysia, and Mexico, may have strong exchange rates in the short term owing to supportive sentiment but weaker rates in the long term owing to higher inflation rates. These countries often attract long-term capital in periods of positive sentiment where the return on investment can more than make up for an underperforming currency in the long term. The SARB’s attempt to attract either short- or long-term capital and support the exchange rate, and thereby inflation, is, therefore, rather futile. Higher real interest rates in SA have been largely ineffective in supporting the rand. Since 2008, while the SARB persistently kept real interest rates higher than those in the US, the rand depreciated more than 125% from R8/$1 to more than R18/$1 in 2023. It even depreciated more than the 96% average depreciation of counterparts such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, Indonesia, and Malaysia, among others. The only ones who have benefitted from higher positive rates in SA are the handful of households with more assets than liabilities.
Finally, there is the US dollar surcharge, whereby the US uses their reserve currency status and their ability to generate excessive demand for globally-traded goods and commodities by using tools such as record-low interest rates, quantitative easing, and large stimulus checks to drive up prices. When inflation eventually occurs in the US, the Federal Reserve will increase interest rates, causing the dollar to appreciate significantly, thus exerting inflationary pressure on emerging countries owing to their declining buying power.
For these reasons, we have consistently cautioned against the rate and the size of the SARB’s interest rate increases. In the past, this blunt tool might have been sufficient to address inflation. But today, where broader economic factors contribute to relatively higher inflation, it is more likely to be ineffective and places an unnecessary burden on a country that is already under severe strain. We agree that price stability is important for a healthy, growing economy, but we believe that the SARB has lost touch with the citizens they serve. Slightly higher inflation with lower interest rates would be easier for most families to stomach.
Dr Francois Stofberg
Managing Director: Efficient Private Clients.
Welcome to the world of banking crises, where there is a consistent flow of money and the stability of a shaky Jenga tower! Here, banks can go from being the pillars of the economy to crumbling ruins faster than you can say “subprime mortgage”. So, grab your wallets and hold on tight as we unpack the events that unfolded in March.
Banking crises have a long history, with notable events including the Great Depression in the 1930s, Latin America in the 1980s, Japan and South-East Asia in the 1990s, and, of course, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008. These financial fiascos have been like a bad penny over the years that will just not go away. They have been caused by a range of factors, including inflation, unhealthy monetary policy, poor banking practices, and a lack of regulation, to name but a few. They have led to significant economic downturns, widespread unemployment, and poverty, but have also led to reforms and changes in the banking industry to prevent future crises. Despite previous efforts to increase oversight, the current banking fiasco, once again, highlights the need for ongoing vigilance in the financial sector.
The most recent events started with the startup-focussed lender, Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) Financial Group, previously the sixteenth largest bank in the United States (US), which became the largest bank to fail since the GFC in 2008. The reason for the recent collapse was owing to the US Federal Reserve’s (Fed’s) aggressive interest rate hikes over the last year, which crippled financial conditions in the startup environment in which SVB was a notable player. Unfortunately, other banks, such as Signature and Silvergate, followed suit as a potential bank run threatened the stability of the overall banking system. Financial markets initially contracted by 4% but, by the end of the month, when the dust had settled, markets made up more than the initial loss.
Investors may be excused for mistaking the SVB banking fiasco for the Lehman Brothers and the GFC. But even though there are similarities, there are also substantial differences. For one, the GFC was triggered by a combination of a housing bubble, subprime mortgages, a lack of regulation, and oversight problems. In contrast, the current fiasco has been caused primarily by the COVID-19 pandemic, the associated economic downturn, and the structural shift in monetary policy. Furthermore, there is the severity of the impact to consider. The GFC was a global event that led to a significant downturn in the global economy. The current fiasco, while serious, has been largely limited to the US. It has also been well contained by the US Fed, US Treasury, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, who have offered to provide support where needed. Hence, the recovery and optimism in stock markets.
Locally, despite the impact of load shedding, downgrades, and our recent greylisting, South African banks have been able to weather the ongoing global sell-off extremely well as they were already well capitalised with high levels of liquidity. Additionally, South African banks have some of the best reputations among global banks. In fact, First National Bank was recently awarded the strongest banking brand in the world, closely followed by Capitec Bank. Overall, there are risks and challenges, but the South African banking system is strong and well regulated.
It is because of reasons like these that we continue to favour South African and emerging market equities, especially at a time when developed markets appear shaky. Emerging markets are only now starting their growth engines.
Dr Francois Stofberg
Managing Director: Efficient Private Clients.
South Africa (SA) is in a peculiar place. For the first time, in a long time, the ruling party might not remain in power. Since the African National Congress came into power in 1994 many South Africans have started to question the party and their policies. Very few, if any, of the promises that were made almost three decades ago, have come to fruition. Weak, unaccountable leaders have left millions of South Africans wanting and there is simply no more room for excuses. Unfortunately, the prevailing economic policies that have taken root in our politics are insufficient. Although these policies were necessary for social upliftment, they have proven to be insufficient for economic upliftment, that is for long-term sustainable economic growth and job creation.
To create a growth environment where income rises rapidly, and unemployment falls at a similar pace, centralising power can help, although too much of it can lead to more corruption and state capture. But centralising power can only work if it is paired with right-leaning economic policies that create wealth. These policies include effective spending on infrastructure, education, and healthcare, and making it as easy as possible to do business in a country. Ease of doing business includes allowing citizens to contract freely with one another without hindrance or interference, making it easy to hire and fire employees, but also making it easy to start, finance, and sustain businesses. China, and possibly even Saudi Arabia, proved this. But when centralising power is paired with left-leaning social policies that focus more on wealth redistribution, governments fall short. SA has proven this time and again. What we have been left with is a country where citizens are socially free but economically imprisoned. We can vote, but half the population lives in poverty.
It is, however, important to understand that redistributive policies are not necessarily less effective, their outcomes are just vastly different from wealth-creative policies. Right-leaning, wealth-creative economic policies lead to economic freedom (high income and low unemployment), whereas left-leaning, redistributive policies lead to social freedom. Wealth-creative economic policies are the only policies that have been proven to generate a return on investment that is greater than their cost because their rate of return is higher. A good example is effective spending on primary and secondary education. What this does is that it rapidly increases the productivity in a country, this not only fills the skills shortage and makes employees more employable, but also gives citizens the basic tools they need to start their own businesses. Redistributive social policies can help to bring social equality, but because they often do not allocate resources effectively, their rate of return is too low to cover their cost, which ends up reducing the potential and relative size of an economy. This is one of the main reasons why we have record-high levels of unemployment. A simple example: Black economic empowerment (BEE) was effective in allowing more social development and inclusion. But because BEE allowed many candidates to receive jobs they might not have been the best, most productive fit for, inefficiencies entered and reduced the overall potential and size of the economy in the long term. BEE should have been a short-term solution that would later have been substituted with effective government spending, support, and the execution of education.
The answer, however, is not in either/or, but in both/and, because focussing too much on either wealth-creative or redistributive policies cannot lead to a sustainable outcome. Similarly, the answer is not in government, but in public-private relationships. No political party has the proven track record of most corporations in SA, therefore, it is a shame that government has been unwilling to learn more from them. United we stand, divided we fall.
Dr Francois Stofberg
Managing Director: Efficient Private Clients, with Specialist Input From Renier Van Zyl
Ray Dalio, a billionaire hedge fund manager, once described politicians who continuously raise the debt ceiling in the United States (US) as “a bunch of alcoholics who write laws to enforce drinking limits”. And to no one’s surprise, the US has, once again, reached the point where they need to increase the debt ceiling.
In January, the US hit its $31.4 trillion debt ceiling and, essentially, set itself up for D-Day (Default Day) a few months later. Janet Yellen, Head of the US Treasury, had to inform House Speaker, Kevin McCarthy, that Treasury was taking measures to ensure that government will be able to keep on paying its bills. Over the next three months, McCarthy will have the near-impossible task of uniting two deeply divided parties, especially in terms of who is to blame for the current debt crisis. What is certain is that, with the looming 2024 elections, neither of the parties will let the other off the hook.
But how did the US get to this point? The US’ national debt has been growing for decades, owing to wars, economic downturns, and major policy initiatives. Two significant periods of debt growth occurred between 1940 and 1950, and between 1980 and 1990, when the US borrowed heavily to finance its war efforts and to support the economy. However, the most significant increase in US debt occurred after 2000, primarily owing to the Global Financial Crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. During this period, low interest rates and government’s belief that they could pay back the debt later encouraged increased spending, which far exceeded their income. In fact, 2001 was the last time that the US government’s revenue exceeded its spending.
It seems an easy solution to continuously raise the debt ceiling without any repercussions but there is a point where it becomes more difficult, owing to higher interest rates. For example, this year the interest payment on US debt is estimated to total $395.5 billion, which is more than government will spend on primary and secondary education. Once the debt limit is reached, Treasury cannot sell any more bonds or securities to pay off the debt from previous deficits, which will result in a default of some sort. A default would severely damage the US government’s credit rating and erode confidence in the US bond market. This, in turn, will cause investors to panic-sell, which can lead to a financial crisis. However, it is important to note that the US has never defaulted on their debt before, and we doubt it will happen soon.
There are steps that the US government can take to avoid defaulting on its debt. Democrats and Republicans can agree to raise the debt ceiling again. Additionally, government can use some of the funds in its Exchange Stabilisation Fund to pay down its debt and it can even reduce some of its wasteful spending. Furthermore, government could consider increasing revenue through tax reforms, such as increasing taxes on high-income earners. Overall, a combination of responsible spending and tax reform can help the US government to avoid a default and to maintain its financial stability.
Even though the US government’s debt levels are a symptom of a bigger problem, it will need to take significant actions to address this problem to avert a fallout in the short term that can shake the entire global financial system. What is certain is that the US will almost certainly raise the debt ceiling again in the future, which will simply result in the debt bomb being kicked further down the road.
Dr Francois Stofberg
Managing Director: Efficient Private Clients
Research by the world’s largest financial institutions seems to support our view that the monetary policy tightening cycle in the United States (US) is approaching its third stage, an economic downturn. We have been expecting this for quite some time and have made the necessary changes to our investment strategies. Usually, when the US sneezes, the rest of the world catches a cold but, in today’s context, an economic downturn in the US will provide the necessary relief to many emerging markets and their currencies. Investors can, therefore, expect a persistently strong equity market in South Africa (SA) and a much stronger rand over the next 12 to 18 months.
The first stage of the monetary policy tightening cycle in the US occurred when markets recognised that the helicopter money provided by the US government produced a spending and inflation overshoot. Markets, consequently, started to price in the upcoming tightening cycle and central banks followed suit with rapid interest rate increases. The second stage occurred as tightening progressed, inflation peaked, and soon started to decline whilst the US economy avoided a more substantial economic contraction. Markets started to price in a soft landing, inflation would be back at 2% within months, and the US Federal Reserve would be able to start cutting interest rates. But, given the current conditions and cause-and-effect relationships, we will, most likely, not see the soft landing that markets have priced in, but an economic downturn; let us not scare everyone and call it what it is, a contraction or a recession.
To get US inflation back down to 2%, wage growth rates need to be cut in half, from their current levels of around 5% to 2.5%. But, for this to happen, household spending must be cut in half, from its persistent levels of around 7% to 3.5%. For this to happen, unemployment needs to be increased by at least 2%. But, to increase unemployment, nominal gross domestic product growth needs to be driven materially below wage growth rates and profit margins need to be compressed enough to produce a 20% decline in earnings. For now, however, the strong labour market is keeping nominal spending too high to slow wages down, which is keeping household incomes too high, which, in turn, is keeping earnings too high. For this reason, a third stage in the tightening cycle, where interest rates remain high or even higher, is more likely. Persistently higher interest rates can then continue to cut into spending and earnings. The funding that companies receive from profits and credit has already started to turn negative, which will eventually cause them to stop hiring. This is an initial indication that we are close to the suggested downturn.
Another favourite indicator used to signal an economic downturn in the US is the diffusion index. This index tracks the divergence of spending on goods versus spending on services. Since 1960, in each of the six prior cases where the diffusion index was negative, there was a contraction in economic growth. Currently, nominal spending on services has grown at a rapid annualised rate of about 6%, whereas real and nominal demand for goods has been on a gradual decline. As a result, the diffusion index has turned negative for the seventh time since 1960. Because spending on services puts upward pressure on employment and wages, inflation will finally be tamed once the contraction does occur and spending is reduced sufficiently.
Dr Francois Stofberg
Managing Director: Efficient Private Clients
Two things stood out during February: The question around offshore investing, and the 2023 Budget in South Africa (SA).
Investing offshore
Research is clear when it comes to liquid assets: Clients should have global exposure between 40% and 60%. This figure, however, gets murky if one considers net asset value. A lot of this has to do with the benefits of diversification, as Nobel laureate Harry Markowitz proved in the 1950s. There are many more investable opportunities in the global markets than there are in SA, and by including these opportunities clients can achieve a better risk-adjusted return in their portfolios. But, because of a poor-performing rand, clients have been reluctant to take money offshore since May 2022. Before that, there was a moment when the rand reached R14.40 levels, but that was when global markets crashed, and investors were simply too scared to take advantage of such a strong-performing rand. We are confident that the rand should strengthen back to levels closer to R16.50, although it can easily strengthen beyond R15.50 levels. But this can take another year. So, what can clients do until then? We believe that there are one of three options (speak to your financial advisor to determine which option is best for you):
2023 Budget
Our overall impression of the 2023 Budget is that the Minister of Finance did all he could with the broken tools he had at his disposal. There were no substantial announcements except for the comments made about Eskom. It seems as if the Minister is nudging the process towards privatisation, which is good news for South Africans. Concerning taxes, if these were increased, we would simply have seen more tax evasion because consumers would not be able to bear the load, and because we have long since passed the point of optimal tax collection on the Laffer curve. We do foresee a revenue risk in the upcoming years because we believe the Minister was too optimistic in his growth forecasts. As the economy and commodity cycle continue to slow down, revenues will also fall. We also foresee a risk to expenses. The largest item that government spends on is civil servant salaries and wages. Because next year is an election year, we doubt that government will be able to maintain a 3% increase. Also, it will be very difficult to stop the COVID grants that more than eight million South Africans have grown dependent on. More expenses mean more debt.
Dr Francois Stofberg
Managing Director: Efficient Private Clients
It is undeniable that South Africa’s (SA’s) economy is in a poor state. But evidence suggests that the rate of deterioration has slowed down considerably. In fact, a strong case can be made to show that the rate of improvement is greater than the rate of deterioration. And, if that is the case, the long-term trajectory is towards a flourishing rather than towards a withering economy, an economy where employment income and life expectancies increase rather than decrease. It is, however, important to understand that a cancerous economy does not get healthy overnight: Monetary and credit cycles, as well as internal cycles of conflict, take many decades to play out. Unfortunately, while many things are looking dire, too many South Africans fixate on the immediate and miss the important structural shifts that have changed our long-term trajectory.
When Jacob Zuma took office, it took him more than a full term to consolidate power and to sow the seeds of corruption, which eventually accumulated into, among others, state capture. But when Cyril Ramaphosa took over in 2019, another shift occurred. Not only did we now have a leader who understood wealth creation, rather than merely living off of the rents of others, but also one with fewer skeletons in his closet. Please bear in mind that perfect “hero leaders” only exist in fairy tales. When we refer to “President Ramaphosa”, we are using this as a collective term for everyone who supports him and his policies.
The next big shift was to build on the work done by the Public Protector who helped us to get rid of Zuma. Ramaphosa (the collective term) cleverly used different independent inquiries to stop the rapid rate of spreading corruption. It started with exposing the Guptas and all those involved with state capture. Later, many heads rolled: Gigaba, Nene, and even Magashule. Afterwards, Zuma ended up in prison. Even if it was only for a few days, no one really believed that it would ever happen.
Another important structural shift occurred in government finances. The state privatised a poorly run state-owned enterprise (SOE) and reduced its wastage on the rest. To this end, South African Airways was privatised, just like alternative energy sources are now also being privatised. Privatisation, smaller wage increases, and the recent announcement that certain SOEs will not need to procure from black economic empowerment (BEE) suppliers indicate a potential and very important shift away from social upliftment (redistribution policies) towards economic upliftment (wealth-creation policies).
An important underlying social shift also occurred: South Africans have grown tired of social injustice and a poorly performing government. South Africans have not only started to vote accordingly but they have also started to band together across different races. When riots hit the heart of Pretoria, and while the devastating riots in KwaZulu-Natal were underway, it was not merely the police that jumped in but South Africans from all races. Although racism is still a very real problem, doing something about a poorly run government and widespread corruption, that is costing lives and livelihoods, has become a point of agreement and co-operation among South Africans.
Of course, much more work is still needed. Leaders in the public and private spheres must be held accountable. Destructive redistributive policies, like BEE, and the protection of employees at the cost of employers, must be better aligned with economic development goals. Government spending on education and healthcare must be improved, and spending on economic upliftment must be increased. But what is clear is that a growing remnant remains in SA that has helped to shift the economy onto the correct trajectory.
– Dr. Francois Stofberg, with specialist input from Renier van Zyl
Yue Fei, the son of an impoverished farmer from Northern China, is one of China’s most decorated and celebrated war heroes. As the Jurchens invaded Southern China in the 1130s, it was Yue Fei who showed tremendous courage as he and his troops fended off the advancing army. He was so courageous that he once, with only 500 men, defeated 100 000 Jurchen soldiers. To this day, Yue Fei is a national symbol of hope during difficult times.
As Southern China looked to Yue Fei then, the world looks to China now to save it from slow growth because of difficult times. It has been a little over a year now that the world has struggled with higher prices, which Generation Z, or even Generation Y, has not seen in their lifetimes. As central banks hiked interest rates to fight inflation, economists and investors grew increasingly concerned about slowing global growth. The International Monetary Fund recently estimated that the global economy will grow by only 2.9% this year versus a 60-year average of 3.5%; Chinese growth could account for two-fifths of that percentage.
This feels like déjà vu from the late 1990s and 2000s when China personified Yue Fei to the world. After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the Chinese economy helped to stabilise the whole of Asia. Then, a decade later during the 2007 financial crisis, China’s growth again helped to stabilise the world. In these instances, China’s economy could routinely deliver between 12% and 15% annual growth, enough to contribute up to 2.5% to global growth. The expectation in 2023 is for China to grow by 5.2%. Even though this percentage is lower than in the recent past, it is still a big improvement from last year’s 2.0%.
There are several reasons for the uptick in Chinese growth. For one, there is the re-opening of the Chinese economy. Investors were concerned that the economy would buckle under the burden of increased COVID-19 cases following the relaxation of China’s year-long zero-COVID policy measures. But there are signs that this is not the case. Although the virus is spreading faster than expected, according to the Chinese government, 80% of the country has already been infected and hospital patient numbers peaked on 5 January. This should translate into increased travelling and spending. Households are also unusually liquid, with bank deposits now exceeding $18 trillion, which includes last year’s $2.6 trillion in savings. These deposits could provide ammunition for a bout of “revenge spending”. And with consumption expected to contribute more than 70% to this year’s gross domestic product, this could provide the necessary boost that the world economy needs.
Conversely, there are also certain elements that could derail China’s growth in 2023. To begin with, no country has rebounded from a COVID outbreak in less than a year. There is always the risk that infections worsen, fatalities rise, and the services and manufacturing sectors close or slow down. Growth in these two sectors is driven by productivity and labour force participation rates. Both of these factors have been on a slowing long-term trend. Should there be a faster deterioration this year, it will have a negative overall effect on growth. There is also the geo-political risk between the United States and China to consider, a risk which could result in legislative and regulatory changes. China’s recent spy balloon is another incident that only seems to have worsened the situation. And finally, there is also the risk that a global recession will spill over into China, or that China’s own debt problems will derail it, which could have a big impact on commodities and China’s property market.
Whether China will be able to pick up the growth baton is unclear, but what is certain is that investors, like us, are siding with the world’s second-largest economy. In January, Chinese equities saw an inflow of $21 billion. This marks the largest inflow since 2014. And that is a big vote of confidence that China will be able to achieve high levels of growth this year as well as in the next few years.